This paper proposes a novel account of the contents of memory. By drawing on insights from the philosophy of perception, I propose a hybrid account of the contents of memory designed to preserve important aspects of representationalist and relationalist views. The hybrid view I propose also contributes to two ongoing debates in philosophy of memory. First, I argue that, in opposition to eternalist views, the hybrid view offers a less metaphysically-charged solution to the co-temporality problem. Second, I show how the (...) hybrid view conceives of the relationship between episodic memory and other forms of episodic thinking. I conclude by considering some disanalogies between perception and memory and by replying to objections. I argue that, despite there being important differences between memory and perception, those differences do not harm my project. (shrink)

The (dis)continuism debate—the debate over whether remembering is a form of imagining—is a prominent one in contemporary philosophy of memory. In recent work, Langland-Hassan (2021) has argued that this debate is best understood as a dispute over whether remembering is a form of constructive imagining. In this paper, I argue that remembering is not a form of constructive imagining because constructive processes in remembering and imagining are constrained, and hence controlled, in different ways at the level of consciousness. More specifically, (...) I argue that remembering and imagining differ in terms of the interventions we can make on the constructive processes as they unfold. If this is correct, then a form of discontinuism is vindicated: remembering and imagining are, on this view, processes of different kinds. (shrink)

The debate over the objects of episodic memory has for some time been stalled, with few alternatives to familiar forms of direct and indirect realism being advanced. This paper moves the debate forward by building on insights from the recent psychological literature on memory as a form of episodic hypothetical thought (or mental time travel) and the recent philosophical literature on relationalist and representationalist approaches to perception. The former suggests that an adequate account of the objects of episodic memory will (...) have to be a special case of an account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought more generally. The latter suggests that an adequate account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought will have to combine features of direct realism and representationalism. We develop a novel pragmatist-inspired account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought that has the requisite features. (shrink)

The viability of a naïve realist theory of memory was a lively debate for philosophers of mind in the first half of the twentieth century. More recently, though, naïve realism has been largely abandoned as a non-starter in the memory literature, with representationalism being the standard view held by philosophers of memory. But rather than being carefully argued, the dismissal of naïve realism is an assumption that sits at the back of much recent theorizing in the philosophy of memory. In (...) this paper, we identify three reasons why philosophers of memory have felt compelled to outright reject naïve realism. We argue that none of those reasons are successful. Thus, far from being a non-starter, we argue that naïve realism is a theoretical perspective that needs to be given serious consideration in current philosophy of memory debates. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between a prominent version of the relational view of memory and recent work on forms of unsuccessful remembering or memory errors. I argue that unsuccessful remembering poses an important challenge for the relational view. Unsuccessful remembering can be divided into two kinds: misremembering and confabulating. I discuss each of these cases in light of a recent relational account, according to which remembering is characterized by an experiential relation to past events, and I argue that experiential (...) relations do not adequately distinguish between remembering and unsuccessful remembering. This is because there are, on the one hand, cases of remembering that do not instantiate the relevant experiential relations, and, on the other hand, cases of confabulation and misremembering that do instantiate the relevant experiential relations. I conclude by suggesting that any successful relationalist attempt to explain remembering needs to come to grips with unsuccessful remembering. (shrink)

Alethism is the view that successful remembering only requires an accurate representation of a past event. It opposes the truth-and-authenticity view, according to which successful remembering requires both an accurate representation of a past event and an accurate representation of a past experience of that event. Alethism is able to handle problematic cases faced by the truth-and-authenticity view, but it faces an important challenge of its own: If successful remembering only requires accurately representing past events, then how is it possible (...) that our memories are also experienced as originating in past experiences of those events? I call this the puzzle of alethic memory. I argue that alethism can be reconciled with the claim that memories are experienced as originating in past experiences of those events—what I call the experience of first-handedness—if we conceive of the phenomenology of remembering in metacognitive terms. According to the metacognitive approach that I favor, the phenomenology of remembering is partly explained by what memory represents and partly explained by the existence of a metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations. I argue that accounting for the feeling of first-handedness in terms of the metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations allows us to solve the puzzle of alethic memory. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Justin D’Ambrosio (2020) has offered an empirical argument in support of a negative solution to the puzzle of Macbeth’s dagger—namely, the question of whether, in the famous scene from Shakespeare’s play, Macbeth sees a dagger in front of him. D’Ambrosio’s strategy consists in showing that “seeing” is not an existence-neutral verb; that is, that the way it is used in ordinary language is not neutral with respect to whether its complement exists. In this paper, we offer (...) an empirical argument in favor of an existence-neutral reading of “seeing”. In particular, we argue that existence-neutral readings are readily available to language users. We thus call into question D’Ambrosio’s argument for the claim that Macbeth does not see a dagger. According to our positive solution, Macbeth sees a dagger, even though there is not a dagger in front of him. (shrink)

The idea that episodic memory is distinguished from semantic memory by the fact that it involves autonoetic consciousness, initially introduced by Tulving, has been influential not only in psychology but also in philosophy, where a variety of approaches to autonoesis and to its relationship to episodicity have been developed. This article provides a critical review of the available philosophical approaches. Distinguishing among representational, metacognitive, and epistemic accounts of autonoesis, it considers these in relation to objective and subjective conceptions of episodicity (...) and assesses them against immediacy and source criteria that any philosophical account of autonoesis should arguably aim to satisfy. (shrink)

This paper addresses some apparent philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism by means of Charles Peirce’s pragmatism. Enactivism’s Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been taken to commit it to some form of anti-realist ‘world-construction’ which has been considered controversial. Accordingly, a new realist enactivism is proposed by Zahidi (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13(3), 2014), drawing on Ian Hacking’s ‘entity realism’, which places subjects in worlds comprised of the things that they can successfully manipulate. We review this attempt, and argue that (...) whilst Zahidi rightly urges enactivists towards ‘internal realism’, he cannot sustain a non-negotiable aspect of realism that is crucial for scientific progress – the claim that multiple subjects inhabit the same world. We explore Peirce’s pragmatism as an alternative solution, foregrounding his distinction between existence and reality, and his inquiry-based account of cognition. These theoretical innovations, we argue, fruitfully generalize Zahidi’s manipulation-based enactivist realism to a richer, inquiry-based enactivist realism. We explore how this realism’s pan-species monism about truth encourages and supports the investigation of non-human animal cognition, and conclude by considering some implications of our discussion for long-standing realism debates within pragmatism. (shrink)

The idea that episodic memory is a form of mental time travel has played an important role in the development of memory research in the last couple decades. Despite its growing importance in psychology, philosophers have only begun to develop an interest in philosophical questions pertaining to the relationship between memory and mental time travel. Thus, this paper proposes a more systematic discussion of the relationship between memory and mental time travel from the point of view of philosophy. I start (...) by discussing some of the motivations to take memory to be a form of mental time travel. I call the resulting view of memory the mental time travel view. I then proceed to consider important philosophical questions pertaining to memory and develop them in the context of the mental time travel view. I conclude by suggesting that the intersection of the philosophy of memory and research on mental time travel not only provides new perspectives to think about traditional philosophical questions, but also new questions that have not been explored before. (shrink)

Radical enactivism, an increasingly influential approach to cognition in general, has recently been applied to memory in particular, with Hutto and Peeters New directions in the philosophy of memory, Routledge, New York, 2018) providing the first systematic discussion of the implications of the approach for mainstream philosophical theories of memory. Hutto and Peeters argue that radical enactivism, which entails a conception of memory traces as contentless, is fundamentally at odds with current causal and postcausal theories, which remain committed to a (...) conception of traces as contentful: on their view, if radical enactivism is right, then the relevant theories are wrong. Partisans of the theories in question might respond to Hutto and Peeters’ argument in two ways. First, they might challenge radical enactivism itself. Second, they might challenge the conditional claim that, if radical enactivism is right, then their theories are wrong. In this paper, we develop the latter response, arguing that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, radical enactivism in fact aligns neatly with an emerging tendency in the philosophy of memory: radical enactivists and causal and postcausal theorists of memory have begun to converge, for distinct but compatible reasons, on a contentless conception of memory traces. (shrink)

Neste artigo apresentamos, de forma concisa e em português, alguns elementos-chave dos principais debates contemporâneos na filosofia da memória. Nosso principal objetivo é tornar essas discussões mais acessíveis aos leitores de língua portuguesa, fornecendo uma atualização importante para esforços anteriores (Sant’Anna & Michaelian, 2019a). Começamos introduzindo a noção de viagem no tempo mental, a qual estabelece a base empírica para a metodologia empregada em trabalhos recentes, antes de apresentar dois debates centrais. Primeiro, o debate entre causalistas e simulacionistas sobre a (...) teoria da lembrança filosoficamente correta (§2). Segundo, o debate entre continuístas e descontinuístas sobre a relação entre lembrança episódica e certas formas de imaginação (em particular, o pensamento episódico acerca do futuro) (§3). Na segunda parte do artigo, apresentamos e exploramos dois tópicos de discussão crescente: a natureza do sentimento de passado característico da memória episódica (§4) e questões de meta-nível relativas ao próprio caráter das controvérsias exploradas na primeira parte do artigo (§5). (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a psychologically-informed philosophical account of the phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive feelings has grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both conceptual and empirical, in favour of the view that the phenomenology of remembering—autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving influentially referred to it, or the feeling of pastness, as we will refer to it here—is an epistemic feeling, but few philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as an epistemic feeling have (...) so far been proposed. Building on insights from the psychological literature, we argue that a form of feeling-based metacognition is involved in episodic remembering and develop an integrated metacognitive feeling-based view that addresses several key aspects of the feeling of pastness, namely, its status as a feeling, its content, and its relationship to the first-order memories the phenomenology of which it provides. (shrink)

Quasi-set theory $\cal Q$ allows us to cope with certain collections of objects where the usual notion of identity is not applicable, in the sense that $x = x$ is not a formula, if $x$ is an arbitrary term. $\cal Q$ was partially motivated by the problem of non-individuality in quantum mechanics. In this paper I discuss the range of explanatory power of $\cal Q$ for quantum phenomena which demand some notion of indistinguishability among quantum objects. My main focus is (...) on the double-slit experiment, a major physical phenomenon which was never modeled from a quasi-set-theoretic point of view. The double-slit experiment strongly motivates the concept of degrees of indistinguishability within a field-theoretic approach, and that notion is simply missing in $\cal Q$. Nevertheless, other physical situations may eventually demand a revision on quasi-set theory axioms, if someone intends to use it in the quantum realm for the purpose of a clear discussion about non-individuality. I use this opportunity to suggest another way to cope with identity in quantum theories. (shrink)

RELAÇÃO E EFEITOS BIOQUÍMICO-NUTRICIONAIS SOBRE O CATARRO GENITAL II E III EM VACAS -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim [email protected] ou [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- 4. CATARRO GENITAL II E III -/- O catarro genital ou metrite (inflamação do miométrio) é uma inflamação inespecífica no trato genital. Existem duas barreiras que impedem a chegada de germes ao interior do trato genital. As barreiras de tipo hemático (diferença de fluxo sanguíneo) e imunossupressão parcial (...) originada pela progesterona, superadas as barreiras, podem se apresentar inflamação no momento do parto ou após o mesmo e frequentemente é acompanhada de retenção de placenta. A principal causa é a deficiência de fatores nutricionais, que causam distúrbios no metabolismo normal do animal. Os catarros trazem problemas de infertilidade, anestro, aumento entre o intervalo entre partos (IEP), o que acarretam altas perdas econômicas na produção (FRAZER, 2005; GORDON, 1996). Podem se manifestar em diferentes graus, que caracterizam-se por fatores específicos; serão abordados os catarros de 2° e 3° grau. 4.1 Relação Sódio (Na) e Potássio (K) Um dos fatores nutricionais associados ao catarro genital é a deficiência de sódio ou o excesso de potássio, o problema existente entre o excesso ou deficiência de um mineral reside na presença imediata de um desequilíbrio homeostático entre a relação fisiológica dos mesmos e portanto um desequilíbrio no metabolismo (funcionamento normal do organismo). A relação potássio:sódio (K:Na) ideal situa-se entre 10-15:1 (DEHNING, 1987) e demonstrou-se que à medida que se amplia essa relação se agrava a eficiência reprodutiva. Ao haver um excesso de sódio no organismo altera-se o equilíbrio de potássio:sódio (K:Na), aumentando os níveis de sódio os níveis de potássio diminuem, causando principalmente problemas na síntese de hormonas sexuais, que por sua vez apresentam um efeito negativo no ciclo estral normal da fêmea, além de problemas no parto (partos distócicos), isto porque no córtex adrenal deve produzir-se aldosterona para regular a homeostase mineral, devido ao fato do substrato bioquímico para a síntese da aldosterona ser o mesmo que para a síntese das hormonas sexuais, nomeadamente estrogênios, portanto, estes não se produzem provocando menor contratilidade uterina, o que favorece a contaminação e colonização bacterial típica dos quadros de metrite. Em média, uma vaca de 600 kg com uma produção de leite de 15 kg/dia, requer uma dieta com 230 g/dia de potássio. As concentrações sugeridas pela NRC para bovinos de corte com dieta de matéria seca (MS) é de 0,6 – 0,7% e a concentração máxima de 3%. Para garantir esses níveis de exigências, as forragens apresentam entre 1 % e 4% de K, portanto são excelentes fontes desse mineral. Em geral, os grãos de cereais são deficientes, menos 0,5% de K, no entanto farelos de oleaginosas são uma boa fonte de suplementação. O excesso de fornecimento de sódio (Na) é relativamente raro, mas clinicamente resulta em achados semelhantes de acetonemia, além de enfraquecimento, retenção de placenta, inflamação do aparelho genital e distúrbios no funcionamento ovariano. As forrageiras possuem um teor deficiente em sódio, uma vez que tal elemento é considerado prejudicial às plantas. Uma das formas de garantir a exigência de sódio no animal, é a disponibilidade à vontade de sal mineral (NaCl) em cochos espalhados pela propriedade. De forma geral, o consumo de sódio por animal/ dia deve ser de 20 a 25 g, o que perfaz aproximadamente 50 g de NaCl/cab./dia, considerando-se um percentual de 39% de sódio nesse composto. Vale salientar que o sódio têm função reguladora, portanto, sua disponibilidade não deve ser maior que a exigência requerida pelo animal. 4.2 Relação do Fósforo (P) Outro fator associado com metrite é, o excesso de fósforo (P) na dieta, pode ser dado por uma excessiva ou inadequada suplementação mineral, por intensa fertilização nas pastagens, por utilização de pastos sumamente jovens ou pelo consumo de grandes quantidades de grãos (soja) e cereais. Simultaneamente, com o excesso de fósforo é frequentemente encontrada uma diminuição do teor de manganês no tecido uterino, como consequência a diminuição da resposta do útero aos estrogênios (DEHNING, 1987). Estes, por sua vez, são responsáveis pelo movimento uterino e por criar maior resistência às infecções do trato genital. O intervalo sugerido pelas instituições de pesquisa está entre 0,12 – 0,20% na dieta de MS. Porém esse intervalo depende de alguns fatores como a idade dos animais e a categoria em que se encontram. O fósforo é um elemento que encontra-se em constantes debates em empresas e instituições agropecuárias. Pesquisadores da Austrália revelaram que 0,12% de sódio na matéria seca estaria o mais próximo possível dos níveis exigidos pelos bovinos de corte, o que contradiz os 30% requeridos pela NRC. Contudo, experimentos realizados pela Embrapa, concluíram que uma dieta em matéria seca de forrageiras com 100%, 70% e 40% dos níveis exigidos de fósforo, tiveram ganho de peso semelhantes. Por exemplo, os animais que receberam 70% dos requisitos tiveram ganho de peso médio entre 0,500 e 0,600 g/dia, muito semelhante ao mesmo ganho quando se forneceram 100% dos requisitos do fósforo. Nas forrageiras a disponibilidade de fósforo depende da disponibilidade do mesmo no solo. Nos grãos de cereais e farelos de oleaginosas contêm de moderado a alto teor de P, e nos produtos de origem animal, como farinha de peixe, o teor de P é considerado alto. 4.3 Relação Cálcio (Ca) e Fósforo (P) O caso de fornecimento exagerado de fósforo causa um efeito inverso da relação cálcio:fósforo (Ca:P), ou seja, sendo o fósforo dominante, maior será o déficit absoluto ou relativo de cálcio, cujas manifestações clínicas no aspecto reprodutivo correspondem amplamente com aquelas do excesso de fósforo. Um excesso absoluto de fósforo na presença de um abastecimento suficiente de cálcio é menos prejudicial para a reprodução do que um fornecimento de fósforo de acordo com os requisitos na presença de níveis deficitários de cálcio (DEHNING, 1987). Isto porque o cálcio, regula a contratilidade do músculo liso, como no miométrio. O intervalo sugerido de cálcio na dieta em MS está entre 0,19 e 0,33%, dependendo de fatores como a idade dos animais e o ganho de peso diário. Por exemplo, uma vaca de 600 kg que produz 15 kg/leite/dia requer uma dieta que contenha 40 g/dia de cálcio. O teor tóxico de cálcio na MS de forrageiras, leguminosas e gramíneas é de 4,4%. Para suprir a exigência em cálcio do animal, para que previna os catarros genitais em seus diferentes graus, bem como demais doenças a dieta está alicerçadamente entre o fornecimento de ração concentrada com misturas como farinha de ossos e fosfato bicálcico com elevados teores de Ca, ou entre os volumosos como as gramíneas, leguminosas ou forrageiras. Vale destacar que as leguminosas possuem baixo teor de Ca em sua composição, entretanto é maior do que a presença em gramíneas. A alfafa é uma forrageira que possui bastante cálcio em sua composição e que pode ser todo disponível para o animal. Por fim, os grãos de cereais como milho, soja, sorgo, etc., possui baixo teor de cálcio. O déficit de cálcio em vacas leiteiras de alta produção traz consequências como a doença da vaca caída (hipocalcemia) devido a sua alta exigência do mineral, especialmente após o parto, isto, por sua vez, causa uma inércia uterina que dificulta a eliminação de bactérias adquiridas durante o parto, propiciando um ambiente adequado para a multiplicação e contaminação do trato genital. 4.4 Relação energia: proteína e Vitamina A O excesso de proteína ocorre frequentemente quando a alimentação é baseada em pastoreio, especialmente quando os animais recebem uma carga intensa de fertilizantes (com estrume ou nitrogênio) e, simultaneamente, é oferecido um suplemento concentrado rico em proteína (DEHNING, 1987). O excesso de proteína depende da quantidade de alimento consumido, sendo os animais de maior produção os mais afetados, uma vez que passam maior tempo para chegar ao peso ideal de abate (animais de corte), ou quando sua produção é potencialmente leiteira. As grandes quantidades de amônio produzido pelo processo de degradação da proteína nos ruminantes resultam numa sobrecarga prolongada no fígado, aumento dos níveis da enzima GOT (alterações hepáticas; que por sua vez resultam na apresentação de catarros genitais de grau II e III) e altos níveis da enzima GLDH. Estes distúrbios são agravados quando, ao mesmo tempo, há uma deficiência de energia. O excesso de proteína crua faz com que nas secreções uterinas se produzam mudanças no conteúdo dos minerais e um desequilíbrio entre os mesmos causando problemas reprodutivos de índole infecciosa e diminui adicionalmente a capacidade de sobrevivência dos espermatozoides e óvulos. A deficiência de vitamina A, também pode causar catarro genital. Recordando que as vitaminas são um grupo de compostos orgânicos essenciais no metabolismo necessário para o crescimento e o bom funcionamento do organismo. Entre estas, a vitamina A é considerada uma vitamina lipossolúvel que deriva dos carotenos presentes nos vegetais. Esta afeta a formação e manutenção da pele, membranas mucosas, ossos e dentes, retina e possui íntima relação com a reprodução. No último caso há falta de secreção da membrana mucosa do trato genital, o que produz susceptibilidade à invasão bacteriana (catarro genital II e III). O corpo obtém a vitamina A, fabricando-a a partir dos carotenos, precursores da vitamina A, que se encontram nos vegetais (forrageiras, leguminosas e gramíneas). O fornecimento de betacarotenos depende do conteúdo dos mesmos na ração. E se houver deficiência destes não pode haver formação de vitamina A, assim a porcentagem de falhas no crescimento do tecido endometrial leva a catarros genitais, mortalidade embrionária e abortos precoces. Logo, mediante os trabalhos anteriores, o fornecimento dessa vitamina, quantos dos demais macronutrientes exigidos pelo animal por meio da alimentação volumosa ou concentrada é essencial para obtenção do sucesso contra esse transtorno reprodutivo do catarro genital, quanto de demais outros seja no combate ou prevenção. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- BARBOSA, Fabiano Alvim; SOUZA, G. M. Efeito dos microminerais na reprodução de bovinos. Belo Horizonte: Portal Agronomia, 2009. BERCHIELLI, Telma Teresinha; PIRES, Alexandre Vaz; OLIVEIRA, SG de. Nutrição de ruminantes. Jaboticabal: funep, 2006. BOLAND, M. P. Efectos nutricionales en la reproducción del ganado. XXXI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2003. DEHNING, R. Interrelaciones entre nutrición y fertilidad. In: Curso Manejo de la Fertilidad Bovina18-23 May 1987Medellín (Colombia). CICADEP, Bogotá (Colombia) Universidad de La Salle, Medellín (Colombia) Instituto Colombiano Agropecurio, Bogotá (Colombia) Sociedad Alemana de Cooperación Técnica-GTZ (Alemania), 1987. DE LUCA, Leonardo J. Nutrición y fertilidad en el ganado lechero. XXXVI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2008. FRAZER, Grant S. Bovine theriogenology. Veterinary Clinics: Food Animal Practice, v. 21, n. 2, p. xiii-xiv, 2005. GORDON, Ian. Controlled reproduction in farm animals series. Nova Iorque: CAB International, 1996. HENRIQUES, Laura Cristina Sant'Anna. Perfil metabólico de vacas da raça Holandesa com catarro genital de graus I, II e III entre o final do puerpério clínico e no puerpério tardio, São Paulo e Paraná, Brasil. 2011. Tese de Doutorado. FMVZUniversidade de São Paulo. MORAES, S. da S. Importância da suplementação mineral para bovinos de corte. Campo Grande, MS: Embrapa Gado de Corte, 2001., 2001. -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Belo Jardim, 29 de março de 2020. (shrink)

Det er min strid at tabellen av intensjonalitet (rasjonalitet, bevissthet, sinn, tanke, språk, personlighet etc.) som har fremtredende her beskriver mer eller mindre nøyaktig, eller i det minste fungerer som en heuristisk for, hvordan vi tenker og oppfører oss, og så omfatter det ikke bare filosofi og psykologi, men alt annet (historie, litteratur, matematikk, politikk etc.). Legg spesielt merke til at intensjonalitet og rasjonalitet som jeg (sammen med Searle, Wittgenstein og andre) ser det, inkluderer både bevisst deliberativspråklig system 2 og (...) bevisstløs automatisert prelinguistic System 1 handlinger eller reflekser. Jeg gir en kritisk undersøkelse av noen av de viktigste funnene fra to av de mest eminente studentene i moderne tid, Ludwig Wittgenstein og John Searle, om den logiske strukturen av intensjonalitet (sinn, språk, bevissthet, oppførsel), tar som utgangspunkt Wittgensteins grunnleggende oppdagelse - at alle virkelig "filosofiske" problemer er de samme - forvirringer om hvordan man bruker språk i en bestemt sammenheng, og så alle løsninger er de samme - ser på hvordan språket kan brukes i sammenheng en sammenheng slik at sannheten forhold (Vilkår for tilfredshet eller COS) er klare. Det grunnleggende problemet er at man kan si noe, men man kan ikke bety (stat klar COS for) noen vilkårlig ytring og mening er bare mulig i en svært spesifikk sammenheng. Jeg analyserer ulike skrifter av og om dem fra det moderne perspektivet til de to tankesystemene (popularisert som "tenker raskt, tenker sakte"), ved hjelp av en ny tabell med intensjonatitet og nye doble systemer nomenklatur. Jeg viser at dette er en mektig heuristisk for å beskrive atferd. Dermed er all oppførsel nært forbundet hvis man tar riktig synspunkt. Den fenomenologiske illusjonen (glemsel en automatisert system 1) er universell og strekker seg ikke bare gjennom filosofi, men gjennom hele livet. Jeg er sikker på at Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg og paven ville være vantro hvis fortalt at de lider av det samme problemet som Hegel, Husserl og Heidegger, (eller at de skiller seg bare i grad fra narkotika- og sexavhengige i å være motivert av stimulering av deres frontale kortices ved levering av dopamin (og over 100 andre kjemikalier) via ventral tegmentum og kjernen accumbens), men det er helt klart sant. Mens fenomenologene bare kastet bort mye folks tid, kaster de bort jorden og deres etterkommers fremtid. (shrink)

Det er min strid at tabellen av intensjonalitet (rasjonalitet, bevissthet, sinn, tanke, språk, personlighet etc.) som har fremtredende her beskriver mer eller mindre nøyaktig, eller i det minste fungerer som en heuristisk for, hvordan vi tenker og oppfører oss, og så omfatter det ikke bare filosofi og psykologi, men alt annet (historie, litteratur, matematikk, politikk etc.). Legg spesielt merke til at intensjonalitet og rasjonalitet som jeg (sammen med Searle, Wittgenstein og andre) ser det, inkluderer både bevisst deliberativspråklig system 2 og (...) bevisstløs automatisert prelinguistic System 1 handlinger eller reflekser. Jeg gir en kritisk undersøkelse av noen av de viktigste funnene fra to av de mest eminente studentene i moderne tid, Ludwig Wittgenstein og John Searle, om den logiske strukturen av intensjonalitet (sinn, språk, bevissthet, oppførsel), tar som utgangspunkt Wittgensteins grunnleggende oppdagelse - at alle virkelig "filosofiske" problemer er de samme - forvirringer om hvordan man bruker språk i en bestemt sammenheng, og så alle løsninger er de samme - ser på hvordan språket kan brukes i sammenheng en sammenheng slik at sannheten forhold (Vilkår for tilfredshet eller COS) er klare. Det grunnleggende problemet er at man kan si noe, men man kan ikke bety (stat klar COS for) noen vilkårlig ytring og mening er bare mulig i en svært spesifikk sammenheng. Jeg analyserer ulike skrifter av og om dem fra det moderne perspektivet til de to tankesystemene (popularisert som "tenker raskt, tenker sakte"), ved hjelp av en ny tabell med intensjonatitet og nye doble systemer nomenklatur. Jeg viser at dette er en mektig heuristisk for å beskrive atferd. Dermed er all oppførsel nært forbundet hvis man tar riktig synspunkt. Den fenomenologiske illusjonen (glemsel en automatisert system 1) er universell og strekker seg ikke bare gjennom filosofi, men gjennom hele livet. Jeg er sikker på at Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg og paven ville være vantro hvis fortalt at de lider av det samme problemet som Hegel, Husserl og Heidegger, (eller at de skiller seg bare i grad fra narkotika- og sexavhengige i å være motivert av stimulering av deres frontale kortices ved levering av dopamin (og over 100 andre kjemikalier) via ventral tegmentum og kjernen accumbens), men det er helt klart sant. Mens fenomenologene bare kastet bort mye folks tid, kaster de bort jorden og deres etterkommers fremtid. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate composition models of incarnation, according to which Christ is a compound of qualitatively and numerically different constituents. We focus on three-part models, according to which Christ is composed of a divine mind, a human mind, and a human body. We consider four possible relational structures that the three components could form. We argue that a ‘hierarchy of natures’ model, in which the human mind and body are united to each other in the normal way, and (...) in which they are jointly related to the divine mind by the relation of co-action, is the most metaphysically plausible model. Finally, we consider the problem of how Christ can be a single person even when his components may be considered persons. We argue that an Aristotelian metaphysics, according to which identity is a matter of function, offers a plausible solution: Christ's components may acquire a radically new identity through being parts of the whole, which enables them to be reidentified as parts, not persons. (shrink)

The psychological reality of an inner awareness built into conscious experience has traditionally been a central element of philosophy of consciousness, from Aristotle, to Descartes, Brentano, the phenomenological tradition, and early and contemporary analytic philosophy. Its existence, however, has recently been called into question, especially by defenders of so-called transparency of experience and first-order representationalists about phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I put forward a defense of inner awareness based on an argument from memory. Roughly, the idea is that since (...) we can only recall something if we were aware of it at the time of its occurrence, and since we can recall our own experiences, we must be aware of our own experiences at the time of their occurrence. The argument is far from new: it goes back to the Buddhist tradition and has been revived more recently in Buddhist Scholarship but also in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, in particular by Uriah Kriegel. However, I believe that, since it is the best extant argument for inner awareness, it deserves more extensive treatment. My goal is to strengthen the memory argument by making some conceptual distinctions as to the exact thesis about inner awareness that the argument is supposed to support, considering different ways the argument may be reconstructed depending on the exact thesis to be supported, and defending the argument from a new objection, raised very recently by Daniel Stoljar. (shrink)

Do the new sciences of well-being provide knowledge that respects the nature of well-being? This book written from the perspective of philosophy of science articulates how this field can speak to well-being proper and can do so in a way that respects the demands of objectivity and measurement.

Following media-theoretical studies that have characterized digitization as a process of all-encompassing cybernetization, this paper will examine the timely and critical potential of Günther Anders’s oeuvre vis-à-vis the ever-increasing power of cybernetic devices and networks. Anders has witnessed and negotiated the process of cybernetization from its very beginning, having criticized its tendency to automate and expand, as well as its circular logic and ‘integral power’, including disruptive consequences for the constitution of the political and the social. In this vein, Anders’s (...) works, particularly his magnum opus Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen [The Obsolescence of Man], sheds new light on the technologically organized milieus of the contemporary digital regime and also highlights a new form of cybernetic ‘conformism’. The goal of the essay is therefore, not only to emphasize the contemporary nature of Anders’s thought but also to use it to frame a critique of current neo-technocratic and, ultimately, post-political concepts, such as ‘algorithmic regulation’, ‘smart states’, ‘direct technocracy’, and ‘government as platform’. This essay argues that cybernetic capitalism is causing what Anders terms ‘ Unfestgelegtheit’ to disappear; that is, we are losing the originary possibility of technologically (re-)structuring our world in alternative ways, particularly given the determinist character of current technologies. (shrink)

In the natural and social sciences, it is common to use toy models—extremely simple and highly idealized representations—to understand complex phenomena. Some of the simple surrogate models used to understand opaque machine learning (ML) models, such as rule lists and sparse decision trees, bear some resemblance to scientific toy models. They allow non-experts to understand how an opaque ML model works globally via a much simpler model that highlights the most relevant features of the input space and their effect on (...) the output. The obvious difference is that the common target of a toy and a full-scale model in the sciences is some phenomenon in the world, while the target of a surrogate model is another model. This essential difference makes toy surrogate models (TSMs) a new object of study for theories of understanding, one that is not easily accommodated under current analyses. This paper provides an account of what it means to understand an opaque ML model globally with the aid of such simple models. (shrink)

Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Timothy Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. From this and his assumption that evidential probabilities cannot be interpreted as the actual credences of human (...) agents either, he concludes that no interpretation of evidential probabilities in terms of credence is adequate. I argue to the contrary. My overarching aim is to show on behalf of Bayesians how one can still interpret evidential probabilities in terms of ideally rational credence and how one can maintain a tight connection between evidential probabilities and ideally rational credence even if the former cannot be interpreted in terms of the latter. By achieving this aim I illuminate the limits and prospects of Bayesianism. (shrink)

Uno de los principios éticos mencionados más frecuentemente en los lineamientos para el desarrollo de la inteligencia artificial (IA) es la transparencia algorítmica. Sin embargo, no existe una definición estándar de qué es un algoritmo transparente ni tampoco es evidente por qué la opacidad algorítmica representa un reto para el desarrollo ético de la IA. También se afirma a menudo que la transparencia algorítmica fomenta la confianza en la IA, pero esta aseveración es más una suposición a priori que una (...) tesis basada en evidencia empírica. Tampoco se discute mucho hasta qué punto es técnicamente posible volver transparente la caja negra de la IA a través de los métodos de explicabilidad. En este capítulo haré un análisis de la interrelación entre los conceptos de transparencia, explicabilidad y confianza. Inicialmente, analizaré los diferentes tipos de opacidad algorítmica para entender mejor cuál es el problema al que nos enfrentamos. En las secciones subsiguientes trazaré la relación entre explicabilidad y transparencia, y presentaré los límites de los métodos actuales de explicabilidad. En la sección final, examinaré la evidencia empírica acerca de la relación entre transparencia y confianza en las decisiones automatizadas basadas en sistemas de IA. (shrink)

This review provides an overview of the ethics of extinctions with a focus on the Western analytical environmental ethics literature. It thereby gives special attention to the possible philosophical grounds for Michael Soulé’s assertion that the untimely ‘extinction of populations and species is bad’. Illustrating such debates in environmental ethics, the guiding question for this review concerns why – or when – anthropogenic extinctions are bad or wrong, which also includes the question of when that might not be the case (...) (i.e. which extinctions are even desirable). After providing an explanation of the disciplinary perspective taken (section “Introduction”), the concept of extinction and its history within that literature are introduced (section “Understanding extinction”). Then, in section “Why (or when) might anthropogenic extinctions be morally problematic?”, different reasons for why anthropogenic extinctions might be morally problematic are presented based on the loss of species’ value, harm to nonhuman individuals, the loss of valuable biological variety and duties to future generations. This section concludes by also considering cases where anthropogenic extinctions might be justified. Section “How to respond to extinctions?” then addresses a selection of topics concerning risks and de-extinction technologies. Finally, the section on “Extinction studies” introduces other viewpoints on the ethics of extinction from the extinction studies literature, followed by the “Conclusion”. (shrink)

Current work in language models (LMs) helps us speed up or even skip thinking by accelerating and automating cognitive work. But can LMs help us with critical thinking -- thinking in deeper, more reflective ways which challenge assumptions, clarify ideas, and engineer new concepts? We treat philosophy as a case study in critical thinking, and interview 21 professional philosophers about how they engage in critical thinking and on their experiences with LMs. We find that philosophers do not find LMs to (...) be useful because they lack a sense of selfhood (memory, beliefs, consistency) and initiative (curiosity, proactivity). We propose the selfhood-initiative model for critical thinking tools to characterize this gap. Using the model, we formulate three roles LMs could play as critical thinking tools: the Interlocutor, the Monitor, and the Respondent. We hope that our work inspires LM researchers to further develop LMs as critical thinking tools and philosophers and other 'critical thinkers' to imagine intellectually substantive uses of LMs. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the search for explainable models and interpretable decisions in AI must be reformulated in terms of the broader project of offering a pragmatic and naturalistic account of understanding in AI. Intuitively, the purpose of providing an explanation of a model or a decision is to make it understandable to its stakeholders. But without a previous grasp of what it means to say that an agent understands a model or a decision, the explanatory strategies will (...) lack a well-defined goal. Aside from providing a clearer objective for XAI, focusing on understanding also allows us to relax the factivity condition on explanation, which is impossible to fulfill in many machine learning models, and to focus instead on the pragmatic conditions that determine the best fit between a model and the methods and devices deployed to understand it. After an examination of the different types of understanding discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature, I conclude that interpretative or approximation models not only provide the best way to achieve the objectual understanding of a machine learning model, but are also a necessary condition to achieve post hoc interpretability. This conclusion is partly based on the shortcomings of the purely functionalist approach to post hoc interpretability that seems to be predominant in most recent literature. (shrink)

In this paper, we identify some key features of what makes something a disease, and consider whether these apply to pregnancy. We argue that there are some compelling grounds for regarding pregnancy as a disease. Like a disease, pregnancy affects the health of the pregnant person, causing a range of symptoms from discomfort to death. Like a disease, pregnancy can be treated medically. Like a disease, pregnancy is caused by a pathogen, an external organism invading the host’s body. Like a (...) disease, the risk of getting pregnant can be reduced by using prophylactic measures. We address the question of whether the ‘normality’ of pregnancy, its current necessity for human survival, or the value often attached to it are reasons to reject the view that pregnancy is a disease. We point out that applying theories of disease to the case of pregnancy, can in many cases illuminate inconsistencies and problems within these theories. Finally, we show that it is difficult to find one theory of disease that captures all paradigm cases of diseases, while convincingly excluding pregnancy. We conclude that there are both normative and pragmatic reasons to consider pregnancy a disease. (shrink)

This book defends an account of justice to nonhuman beings – i.e., to animals, plants etc. – also known as ecological or interspecies justice, and which lies in the intersection of environmental political theory and environmental ethics. More specifically, against the background of the current extinction crisis this book defends a global non-ranking biocentric theory of distributive ecological/interspecies justice to wild nonhuman beings, because the extinction crisis does not only need practical solutions, but also an account of how it is (...) the outcome of large-scale injustice. This book not only provides a novel theoretical framework that supports such a claim, but it also develops the theoretical tools to find just compromises between the entitlements of intraspecies and intra-human global distributive justice to ecological space for the purpose of working towards a vision of just conservation. -/- Content: 1. Introducing Ecological Justice 2. Political Non-Ranking Biocentrism 3. The Community of Justice 4. The Currency of Distributive Justice 5. The Principles of Distributive Justice 6. Ecological Justice and the Capabilities Approach 7. Biodiversity Loss: An Injustice? 8. Who Owns the Earth? 9. Visions of Just Conservation 10. Outlook for Implementation . (shrink)

Many have argued that a rational agent's attitude towards a proposition may be better represented by a probability range than by a single number. I show that in such cases an agent will have unstable betting behaviour, and so will behave in an unpredictable way. I use this point to argue against a range of responses to the ‘two bets’ argument for sharp probabilities.

It is commonly held that our intuitive judgements about imaginary problem cases are justified a priori, if and when they are justified at all. In this paper I defend this view — ‘rationalism’ — against a recent objection by Timothy Williamson. I argue that his objection fails on multiple grounds, but the reasons why it fails are instructive. Williamson argues from a claim about the semantics of intuitive judgements, to a claim about their psychological underpinnings, to the denial of rationalism. (...) I argue that the psychological claim — that a capacity for mental simulation explains our intuitive judgements — does not, even if true, provide reasons to reject rationalism. (More generally, a simulation hypothesis, about any category of judgements, is very limited in its epistemological implications: it is pitched at a level of explanation that is insensitive to central epistemic distinctions.) I also argue that Williamson’s semantic claim — that intuitive judgements are judgements of counterfactuals — is mistaken; rather, I propose, they are a certain kind of metaphysical possibility judgement. Several other competing proposals are also examined and criticized. (shrink)

‘The Union of Cause and Effect in Aristotle : Physics III 3’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 32, pp. 205-232, May 2007.: I argue that Aristotle introduced a unique realist account of causation, which has not hitherto been appreciated in the history of philosophy: causal realism without a causal relation. In his account, cause and effect are unified by the ectopic actualization of the agent’s potentiality in the patient. His solution consists in the introduction of a property that belongs to (...) one subject but is realized in another subject on whose state this realization depends. I identify and analyze the multiple ontological dependencies between the causal state of the agent and that of the patient during their causal activity. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a new version of the acquaintance view of the nature of introspection of phenomenal states. On the acquaintance view, when one introspects a current phenomenal state of one's, one bears to it the relation of introspective acquaintance. Extant versions of the acquaintance view neglect what I call the phenomenal modification problem. The problem, articulated by Franz Brentano in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, is that drawing introspective attention to one's current conscious experience may modify (...) its phenomenology. Failing to take phenomenal modification into account affects the adequacy of extant versions of the acquaintance view. The purpose of this paper is to develop a better version, the integration account, that meets the phenomenal modification challenge while preserving the merits of other versions. (shrink)

Introspective knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge we have by being directly aware of our phenomenally conscious states. In this paper, I argue that introspective knowledge by acquaintance is a sui generis kind of knowledge: it is irreducible to any sort of propositional knowledge and is wholly constituted by a relationship of introspective acquaintance. My main argument is that this is the best explanation of some epistemic facts about phenomenal consciousness and introspection. In particular, it best explains the epistemic asymmetry between (...) a subject who has never had a certain phenomenal state and one who has. I also consider two theoretical objections to my claim: an objection from disunity and an objection from mysteriousness. I show that these objections can be answered and that introspective knowledge by acquaintance being sui generis remains a live option on the table. (shrink)

Thick concepts, namely those concepts that describe and evaluate simultaneously, present a challenge to science. Since science does not have a monopoly on value judgments, what is responsible research involving such concepts? Using measurement of wellbeing as an example, we first present the options open to researchers wishing to study phenomena denoted by such concepts. We argue that while it is possible to treat these concepts as technical terms, or to make the relevant value judgment in-house, the responsible thing to (...) do, especially in the context of public policy, is to make this value judgment through a legitimate political process that includes all the stakeholders of this research. We then develop a participatory model of measurement based on the ideal of co-production. To show that this model is feasible and realistic, we illustrate it with a case study of co-production of a concept of thriving conducted by the authors in collaboration with a UK anti-poverty charity Turn2us. (shrink)

Many word forms in natural language are polysemous, but only some of them allow for co-predication, that is, they allow for simultaneous predications selecting for two different meanings or senses of a nominal in a sentence. In this paper, we try to explain (i) why some groups of senses allow co-predication and others do not, and (ii) how we interpret co-predicative sentences. The paper focuses on those groups of senses that allow co-predication in an especially robust and stable way. We (...) argue, using these cases, but focusing particularly on the multiply polysemous word ‘school’, that the senses involved in co-predication form especially robust activation packages, which allow hearers and readers to access all the different senses in interpretation. (shrink)

Biological conservation practices and approaches take many forms. Conservation projects do not only differ in their aims and methods, but also concerning their conceptual and normative background assumptions and their underlying motivations and objectives. We draw on philosophical distinctions from the ethics of conservation to explain variances of different positions on conservation projects along six dimensions: (1) conservation ideals, (2) intervention intuitions, (3) the moral considerability of nonhuman beings, (4) environmental values, (5) views on nature and (6) human roles in (...) nature. The result is a map of the moral landscape of biological conservation, on which these six dimensions are layered. This map functions as a heuristic tool to understand conceptual and normative foundations of specific conservation projects, which we will illustrate with four paradigmatic examples: the Pisavaara Strict Nature Reserve, Predator Free New Zealand, the Oostvaardersplassen Nature Reserve and the Great Green Wall Project. With this map as a heuristic tool, we aim to conceptually illuminate disagreement and clarify misunderstandings between representatives of different environmental protection strategies and to show that the same project can be supported (or criticised) on different grounds. (shrink)

This book surveys research in quantification starting with the foundational work in the 1970s. It paints a vivid picture of generalized quantifiers and Boolean semantics. It explains how the discovery of diverse scope behavior in the 1990s transformed the view of quantification, and how the study of the internal composition of quantifiers has become central in recent years. It presents different approaches to the same problems, and links modern logic and formal semantics to advances in generative syntax. A unique feature (...) of the book is that it systematically brings cross-linguistic data to bear on the theoretical issues, discussing French, German, Dutch, Hungarian, Russian, Japanese, Telugu (Dravidian), and Shupamem (Grassfield Bantu), and pointing to formal semantic literature involving quantification in around thirty languages. -- -/- 1. What this book is about and how to use it; 2. Generalized quantifiers and their elements: operators and their scopes; 3. Generalized quantifiers in non-nominal domains; 4. Some empirically significant properties of quantifiers and determiners; 5. Potential challenges for generalized quantifiers; 6. Scope is not uniform and not a primitive; 7. Existential scope versus distributive scope; 8. Distributivity and scope; 9. Bare numeral indefinites; 10. Modified numerals; 11. Clause-internal scopal diversity; 12. Towards a compositional semantics of quantifier words. (shrink)

Most recent philosophical theories of consciousness account for it in terms of representation, the bulk of the debate revolving around whether (suitably) representing something is sufficient for consciousness (as per first-order representationalism) or some further (meta-)representation is needed (as per higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism). In this paper, I explore an alternative theory of consciousness, one that aims to explain consciousness not in terms of representation but in terms of the epistemically and metaphysically direct relation of acquaintance. I call this the (...) Inner Acquaintance Theory of consciousness (IAT). Roughly, on IAT, what makes a mental state conscious is its subject being acquainted with it. Though not wholly unprecedented, IAT is still at the fringe of consciousness debates and remains largely underexplored. The main goal of this paper is to take some steps toward developing the details of IAT, illustrate its potential explanatory power, and put it forward as a plausible alternative to representational theories, with the hope that this will contribute to shifting IAT closer to the center of the debate. Here is how I proceed. In §2 I introduce a notion—inner awareness—that is crucial both to contextualize and to understand IAT. In §3 I provide some preliminary motivation for exploring IAT. In §4 I explain the notion of acquaintance and illustrate some of the features that are typically attributed to it in the literature. The details of IAT are then shaped through four main decision points. I address them in §§5-8, where I suggest a particular choice at each decision point, thereby progressively building up a view that I consider particularly promising. (shrink)

A variety of mental disorders—including ASD, ADHD, major depression, and anxiety disorder, among others—may directly impact what an agent notices or fails to notice. A recent debate has emphasised the potential significance of such “impairment-derived ignorance,” and argued that failure to account for certain compelling cases would seriously undermine theories which intend to establish the conditions for blameworthy ignorance. In this comment we argue, contra a recent challenge, that Quality of Will (QW) accounts are able to explain the normative significance (...) of impairment-derived ignorance. The plausible, ambivalent results QW accounts yield in difficult cases of impairment-derived ignorance further reveals the explanatory power of such accounts when it comes to blameworthy ignorance. (shrink)

In this Introduction we introduce the central themes of the Evaluative Perception volume. After identifying historical and recent contemporary work on this topic, we discuss some central questions under three headings: (1) Questions about the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of experience? (2) Questions about the Epistemology of Evaluative Perception: Can evaluative experiences ever justify evaluative (...) judgments? Are experiences of values necessary for certain kinds of justified evaluative judgments? (3) Questions about Value Theory and Evaluative Perception: Is the existence of evaluative experience supported or undermined by particular views in value theory? Are particular views in value theory supported or undermined by the existence of value experience? (shrink)

Difficulty is often treated as blame-mitigating, and even exculpating. But on some occasions difficulty seems to have little or no bearing on our assessments of moral responsibility, and can even exacerbate it. In this paper, I argue that the relevance (and irrelevance) of difficulty with regard to assessments of moral responsibility is best understood via Quality of Will accounts. I look at various ways of characterising difficulty – including via sacrifice, effort, skill and ‘trying’ – and set out to demonstrate (...) that these factors are only blame-mitigating where, and to the extent that, they complicate ascriptions of insufficient concern. Matters become more complex, however, when we turn to difficult circumstances that seem to generate such objectionable attitudes. This is arguably the case with epistemic difficulty and certain instances of moral ignorance. Here I argue that certain difficult circumstances diminish the sense in which false moral beliefs are genuinely revelatory of the agents who hold them. In particular, I draw on the distinction between difficulty that generates objectionable attitudes, and objectionable attitudes that generate difficulty. I argue that the former, but not the latter, can plausibly be viewed as blame mitigating, and that this would apply to (limited) cases of moral ignorance. (shrink)